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The Scope of the CISG Provisions on 
Damages 
INGEBORG SCHWENZER'' AND PASCAL HACHEM'''' 
I GENERAL 
In the same way as under domestic laws, questions of damages have been 
among the most discussed issues under the Convention during the last 10 
years. 1 Recently, the Advisory Council on the CISG (CISG-AG) published a 
special opinion on the calculation of damages undet Article 7 4 CISG. 2 Why 
are damages such a debated issue? The history of Article 7 4 CISG can be 
traced back to its predecessor, Article 82 of the Uniform Law of Interna-
tional Sales (ULIS). Both during the preparation of the CISG and at the 
Vienna Conference, there were hardly any discussions about the damages 
provisions. The wording of Article 82 ULIS remained practically 
linchanged. 3 
What guidelines can be derived from the wording of Article 74 CISG? 
As Honnold has described it, the standard established by Article 7 4 · is brief 
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1 See JY Gotanda, 'Awarding Damages under the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods: a Matter of Interpretation' (2005) 37 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 9 5; D Saidov, 'Damages: The Need for Uniformity' (2006) 2 5 Journal of Law 
and Commerce 393 (hereinafter 'Damages'); D Saidov, 'Standards of Proving Loss and 
Determining the Amount of Damages' (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law r (hereinafter 
'Standards'); MW Brölsch, Schadensersatz und CISG (Frankfurt, Lang, 2006); B Zeller, 
Damages under the Conventions of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (New York, 
Oceana, 2005). 
2 CISG-AC Opinion No 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74, rapporteur 
Professor JY Gotanda, available at www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/docs/AC-opinion %206.pdf 
( accessed 2 7 J une 2007). 
3 Of course, Art 82 ULIS was confined to cases where the contract has not been avoided; see 
H Stoll and G Gruber in P Schlechtriem and I Schwenzer (eds), Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) {Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
2005) Art 74, para 6; U Magnus 'Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG)' in J Staudinger (ed), 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetzen und Nebengesetzen 
(Berlin, Sellier/de Gruyter, 13th edn, 2005) Art 74, para 6. 
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but powerful.4 According to this prov1S1on, damages 'consist of a sum 
equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered ... as a consequence of 
the breach'. lt is unanimously held that the standard laid down in this 
article is designed to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as if 
the other party had properly performed the contract.5 The essential basic 
concept is the principle of full compensation. Thus, the loss for which 
compensation is to be granted includes both the lost expectation of perfor-
mance as well as losses incurred in reliance on performance. 6 
Whereas these basic principles remain undisputed, the details have 
become more and more controversial. This is due to several developments 
in domestic legal systems and uniform law projects, such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) and 
the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). For example, in the UK, 
the last 20 years have been characterised by a real upheaval in the law of 
damages; to mention but a few of the leading cases: Ruxley,7 BlakeB and 
Farley.9 In Germany, the German Forum of Jurists (Deutscher 
Juristentag)-the most influential group for enhancing the development of 
legal policy-dedicated a whole session of its 2006 conference to 'New 
Perspectives in the Law of Damages'.ro On an international level, both the 
UNIDROIT PICC and the PECL must be mentioned here. In the first 
place, both sets of rules are, in essence, based on the same principle as the 
CISG, namely the principle of full compensation. rr However, they go 
beyond the wording of the CISG. They not only expressly provide that the 
4 JO Honnold, Uniform Law for International Safes under the r980 United Nations 
Convention, (The Hague, Kluwer International Law vd edn, 1999) para 403. 
5 See Secretariat Commentary, 'Art 70, para 3' in Official Records 5 9; GH Treitel, 'Remedies 
for Breach of Contract' (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) 82; Honnold, above n 4, para 403; 
CISG-AC, above n 2, para r.1; Gotanda, above n 1, 98. 
6 See Case No 7 Ob 301/o1t, 14 January 2002, Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria Suprerne 
Court), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/o2orr4a3.html (accessed 28 June 2007); 
Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, paras 2 et seq; Magnus, above n 3, Art 74, para 6; P Huber 
in K Rebmann, FJ Säcker and R Rixecker (eds), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 
(Munich, Beck, 4th edn, 2004) Art 7 4, para 18; D Saidov, 'Methods of Limiting Damages under 
the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods', (2002) 14 Pace 
International Law Review 307; cf W Witz in W Witz, HC Salger and M Lorenz (eds), 
International Einheitliches Kaufrecht: Praktiker-Kommentar und Vertragsgestaltung zum CISG 
(Heidelberg, Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, 2000) Art 74, para 12. 
7 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 (HL). For comment and 
analysis,. see B Coote, 'Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest' ( 1997) 5 6 CL] 
537. 
B Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). For comrnent and analysis, see G Jones, 
'Must the Party in Breach Account for Profits from his Breach of Contract' in I Schwenzer and G 
Hager (eds) Festschrift für Peter Schlechtriem zum 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 
2003) 763. 
9 Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732 (HL). For comment and analysis, see R Holmes, 'Mental 
Distress Damages for Breach of Contract' 3 5 (2004) Victoria University Wellington Law 
Review 699 et seq. 
10 Fora report on this session, see S Manner, 'Tagungsbericht, Abteilung Zivilrecht' [2007] 
Juristen Zeitung 232. 
11 Art 7.4.2(1) PICC; Art 9:502 PECL. 
CISG Provisions on Damages 93 
term 'loss' includes non-pecuniary loss, r2 but they also provide guidelines 
as to when future loss is to be compensated for. r3 These developments give 
rise to and, at the same time, are part of a general discussion of the aims 
and tasks of the law of damages in a modern world. Whereas, up until a 
few years ago, the main focus was on a very narrow notion of compen-
sation, recent developments indicate that different aspects are now gaining 
importance. The pure 'economic benefits' principle has yielded to the 
'performance' principle;r4 issues of prevention and deterrence have 
emerged, demanding, among other things, disgorgement of profits from 
the breaching party or other punitive mechanisms. All of these issues are 
accentuated by other emerging developments of modern global sales law, 
such as the protection of human rights by private companies in all sectors 
of international trade. r5 
These new challenges cannot go unnoticed when applying and inter-
preting the CISG. The CISG began as a great endeavour to harmonise 
international sales law and has achieved this aim to a large extent. r6 If it 
does~ _not respond to current demands and continues to focus on the state 
of discussion prevc1lent in the I97os (or, more accurately, the nineteenth 
century), it risks falling back into obscurity. The necessary adjustments will 
then be made by the concurrent application of domestic remedies to 
precisely those . cases for · which the CISG was originally designed. The 
battle for uniformity fought by the CISG would be lost. 
Although the following remarks are based upon the status quo, we see 
it as our task to contribute to the necessary, cautious and moderate 
modernisation of the CISG provisions on damages. 
II 'ECONOMIC BENEFITS' PRINCIPLE V 'PERFORMANCE' 
PRINCIPLE 
Although everybody seems to talk about the principle of full compen-
sation, its precise meaning is far from clear. Full compensation or 
compensation for pecuniary loss is usually limited to the 'economic 
benefits' principle or, as it is called under Germanic legal systems, the 
12 Art 7.4.2(2) PICC; Art 9:501(2)(a) PECL. 
13 Art 7.4.3 PICC; Art 9:501 PECL Comment F. 
14 See Coote, above n 7, 541 et seq. 
15 See I Schwenzer and B Leisinger, 'Ethical Values and Internationaf Sales Contracts' in R 
Cranston et al (eds), Commercial Law Challenges in the 2rst Century,Jan Hellner in Memoriam 
(Stockholm, lustus Förlag, 2007); A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2003) 16 (in the context of English law). 
16 For a list of rnernber states, see www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ 
1980CISG.htrnl (accessed 27 June 2007). Until now the CISG has entered into force in 70 states. 
The Convention thereby covers rnore than two-thirds of all world trade. Nearly 2000 court 
decisions and arbitral awards rendered are published. 
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'difference theory'. 1 7 All other losses of the aggrieved party that do not 
directly appear on the balance sheet are simply deemed tobe non-pecuniary 
and thus not compensable. The only acknowledged exception to this 
principle is found in Article 76 ClSG, which allows the aggrieved party to 
calculate its damages for the loss in the value of the goods according to the 
current price on an abstract level, regardless of whether it has actually 
undertaken any cover transaction or not. 18 The consequences of this strict 
interpretation of pecuniary loss may be best illustrated by three 
hypotheticals. 
Hypothetical r: Suppose that the buyer is a commercial carrier buying 
IO trucks for transportation. If they are not delivered in time, it rents 
substitute trucks to carry on its business. Rental costs will unanimously 
be recognised as pecuniary loss under the economic benefits principle. 
However, let us change the facts slightly. The buyer is no longer a profes-
sional carrier but a non-governmental organisation (NGO) transporting 
food to the Sahel. As no substitute trucks can be rented where they .are 
needed, no loss in this sense occurs. 
Hypothetical 2: Suppose that a Swiss company, conscious of human 
rights, buys T-shirts from a seller in lndia on the· contractual condition 
that no children are to be employed in manufacturing the goods. The 
buyer is willing to pay a price rno% higher than the market price to 
ensure that such basic human rights are complied with. If the seller 
breaches the contract by employing children, this fact does not fundamen-
tally change the tangible properties of the goods. If the buyer resells the 
goods without anybody becoming aware of the breach of contract, its rev-
enues will be the same as if the seller had complied with the terms of the 
contract. Thus, in the strict sense, no pecuniary loss could be ascertained. 
Hypothetical 3 :1 9 lmagine that a professional photographer buys a 
Ferrari in a flashy pink colour, paying extra for this special paintwork for 
photo shootings. The Ferrari is delivered i~ ordinary standard red. As 
nobody else would buy a flashy pink Ferrari, the resale price of a standard 
red one is even higher than that of the car bargained for. Does this mean 
that the photographer has suffered no loss and cannot claim damages? 
The majority view that no damages are tobe awarded in such cases because 
of the absence of pecuniary loss is not convincing. If one confines damages 
to the economic loss caused by the non-performance, one ignores the fact 
that the aggrieved party has paid the price precisely to obtain the correct 
performance of the contract. This is, indeed, a pecuniary loss and not just a 
17 See I Schwenzer, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Bern, Stämpfli, 4th 
edn, 2006), para r4.03. 
18 See Honnold, above n 4, 4r4; Stall and Gruber, above n 3, Art 76, para r; Huber, above n 6, 
Art 76, para r; Brölsch, above n r, 92 et seq. 
19 This case is comparable to the well-known case Ruxley, above n 7. 
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non-pecuniary loss. lt is precisely this notion that distinguishes contractual 
damages from tortious damages. There can be no doubt that the scope of 
losses tobe compensated for has to reflect the very purpose of the duty that 
has been breached. lt may be conceded that duties arising in tort primarily 
protect integrity and against economic losses resulting directly from 
infringements of these duties. Contractual duties, on the other hand, aim at 
securing perfo.1:mance. 20 The creditor must receive what it has bargained 
and paid a price for. 
A further argument advanced in favour of the economic benefit 
approach, namely that any damages for lasses that cannot be qualified as 
pecuniary losses in the traditional sense yield a windfall profit to the 
aggrieved party,21 can easily be discarded as well. Even if it were assumed 
that, according to the pure balance sheet such a windfall profit arises, the 
question has, to be asked as to who is to get the windfall pro fit if one 
denies damages for the aggrieved party. Should the breaching party in our 
hypotheticak really · get off scot-free because it contracted with an NGO 
inste.:!,d, of a professional carrier; because the breach was never made 
public; or because the common Ferrari buyer prefers standard red over the 
extravagant flashy pink? The answer is a clear 'no'. This solution is further 
underscored by the necessity to prevent breaches of contract. If damages in 
these cases were to be denied, all the breaching party would have to face 
would be the avoidance of the contract, which presupposes a fundamental 
breach, thus merely depriving it of the purchase price. If there is no funda-
mental breach (Article 25 ClSG), in some cases-as in the Ferrari 
hypothetical, where the resale price of the flashy pink Ferrari is lower than 
that of the standard red one-even a reduction of the price (Article 50 
CISG) would fail. This follows from the majority view thatthe potential 
resale price is decisive not only for the remedy of damages, but also for the 
reduction of the purchase price.22 
Ultimately, the possibility to contract for a penalty and thus recover, 
notwithstanding the fact that no pecuniary losses in the narrow sense can 
be ascertained, does not solve the problem in the cases discussed here. 
First, it is a ·circular argument as often the otherwise applicable domestic 
law requires there to be a pecuniary lass under the ClSG for the validity of 
the penalty clause. Secondly, the aggrieved party may not always be in the 
economic position to bargain for a penalty. 
Admittedly, the solution of awarding damages in the aforesaid cases 
does not, in principle, solve the crucial question of how to calculate these 
20 See Coate, above n 7, 540, 566. 
21 On this issue, see Coate, ibid, 548 et seq. 
22 See M Müller-Chen, in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer, above n 3, Art 50, paras 8, 9; Magnus, 
above n 3, Art 50, para 20; Honnold, above n 4, para 3 r2; H Salger in Witz et al, above n 6, Art 
50, para 3; F Enderlein, D Maskow and H Strohbach, Internationales Kaufrecht (Berlin, Haufe, 
r99r) Art 50, para 5. 
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damages. Still, even though the calculation of damages may be much more 
difficult than in clear-cut cases, it is still possible. In cases of loss of use 
(hypothetical r), damages may be calculated by reference to a hypothetical 
market for the goods involved. For goods generally subject to the CISG, 
such a hypothetical market will usually be av.ailable. Nowadays, there is a 
rental market for almost everything; one may even rent a tank for warfare! 
And this holds true not only for fungible goods-one may also rent a 
Picasso painting for an exhibition. Thus, just as calculating damages for 
loss in value in relation to a market price is possible under Article 76 
CISG, loss of use may be calculated by the same method of referring to a 
market price and rental market under Article 74 CISG. 
If the focus is shifted from the economic consequences of non-perfor-
mance to the 'performance' principle, there is also an easy way to calculate 
these damages in hypotheticals 2 and 3. If the buyer pays twice as high a 
price to have T-shirts manufactured without child labour, the minimum 
loss it sustains is half of the purchase price, as this represents its interest in 
the correct performance. Usually this calculation can also be clone by 
referring to the relevant markets. Today there are markets for products 
manufactured under any-including inhumane-conditions, as opposed to 
markets for products produced in compliance with basic human rights, or 
products that are fairly traded. 
Likewise, the Ferrari hypothetical can be solved. Damages consist of the 
difference between a Ferrari with standard red painting and the costs 
necessary for flashy pink paintwork. This hypothetical raises another 
question: may the buyer in this case calculate its damages according to the 
costs of corrective paintwork? If the buyer has, indeed, had the colour 
changed and ensued corresponding costs which appear on the balance 
sheet, there can be no doubt that this is a possible basis of calculation. 
However, if the buyer resigns itself to the standard red colour, is it then 
prevented from claiming damages in the amount of the potential repair 
costs? Again, if the buyer refrains from actual repair, it cannot be to the 
benefit of the breaching seller. The seller owes performance in any case; it 
is up to the buyer to decide whether or not it uses the damages obtained 
for actual repairs. The necessary protection of the seller can be achieved 
through the mitigation principle laid down in Article 77 CISG. If the repair 
costs are grossly excessive compared with the interest a reasonable buyer 
would have in the strict performance of the contract, the buyer would 
breach its duty to mitigate losses if it were to claim these costs as damages 
for non-performance. 2 3 This duty to mitigate, however, applies regardless 
of whether the buyer chooses to have the goods repaired or not. 
23 See I Schwenzer and S Manner, 'The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The Impact of the 
Non-Breaching Party's (Non-)Behavior on its CISG-Remedies' in UG Schroeter and 
C Baasch-Andersen (eds) Festschrift for Albert H Kritzer (London, 2008); Stoll and Gruber, 
above n 3, Art 77, para 9. 
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III LOSS OF PROFIT AND LOSS OF REPUTATION 
A Loss of Profit and Loss of Reputation as Pecuniary Losses 
Within the different losses possible, Article 7 4 CISG emphasises the loss of 
profit. The word 'loss' alone might be read narrowly to refer to 
out-of-pocket reliance expenses, but the mention of 'loss of profit' makes it 
clear that this is not what was intended. 2 4 If, at the time of the decision of 
the court or tribunal, no further losses are to be expected, the calculation of 
loss of profit usually causes no further problems. Thus, if the. buyer 
repudiates the contract, the seller's lost profit equals the purchase price 
minus the costs incurred by the seller. Today, it is also unanimously held 
that this· loss of profit can also be claimed in the so-called 'lost volume' 
cases. Such a lost volume situation arises when the seller has more goods in 
stock than it needs to serve its contracts, thus losing the profit on an 
additional transaction it could have carried out had the contract been 
performed. 2 5 If ·the seller does not deliver the goods and the buyer is thus 
unable tö fulfil contracts with its customers, the loss of profit consists of the 
resale price minus certain costs. However, there is no agreement as to which 
costs are tobe deducted. 2 6 
Special problems arise in today's international sales in connection with 
corporate groups where, typically for tax purposes, the contractual partner 
is a domestic subsidiary, but the loss may be-at least ultimately-
sustained by the parent company. In those legal systems that do not 
recognise undisclosed agency and thus do not give the principal a 
contractual right of recovery of its own, there can be no doubt that such a 
shift of loss cannot free the obligor from liability. 2 7 The contractual 
partner may liquidate the loss sustained by the parent company. 
Difficult problems arise where damages fqr future losses are claimed. 
Whereas Article 9:5or(2)(b) PECL as well as Article 7,4,3(r) PICC allow 
for the recovery of future losses, Article 7 4 CISG does not expressly state 
that such losses may be recovered. However, the principle of full compen-
sation certainly demands recovery in these cases, subject to the principles 
of foreseeability and mitigation. How to prove future losses is another 
question that will be discussed later. 
Closely connected to the question of loss of profit is the concept of loss 
of a chance. 28 Suppose that the famous architects Herzog & de Meuron 
24 EA Farnsworth, 'Damages and Specific Relief' (I979) 27 American Journal of Contract 
Law 249. 
25 For the discussion of lost volume cases under the CISG, see Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 
75, para n; Saidov, above n 6, I.2(c); Brölsch, above n I, 87 et seq. 
26 See CISG-AC, above n 2, 3.rn. 
27 But see Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, para 26. 
28 See CISG-AC, aboven 2, 3.I5; Saidov, 'Standards', aboven I, 39 etseq; Saidov, 'Damages', 
above n I, 400 et seq. 
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are bidding for the erection of the Olympic stadium in Beijing. As they 
depend on the delivery of certain goods to finish their bid and the seller 
fails to deliver in time, they miss the deadline for entering the competition. 
May they claim damages for the loss of a chance to win the competition? 
Some authors strictly deny the recoverability of this loss. 2 9 Yet, there can 
be no question that such chances have an economic value in the light of 
the significant sums of money invested in biddings. To give just one 
example: in Germany the German Football Association (Deutscher 
Fussballbund) invested around €ro million in bidding for hosting the 2006 
FIFA World Championship. The only difference between the 'loss of 
chance' and the traditional 'loss of profit' is the level of certainty with 
which it can be proven. Therefore, the wording 'loss of profit' in Article 7 4 
CISG naturally encompasses the recovery of 'loss of a chance'. 
Similar problems arise in c<:mnection with 'loss of goodwill' or 'damage 
to reputation'. Again, there can be no doubt that they do have an 
economic value having regard to the sums spent to enhance reputation in 
the market.3° Therefore, the principle of full compensation demands 
recovery of losses in this respect. 
B Burden and Standard of Proof 
As already mentioned, the crucial question surrounding 'loss of profit' is 
not whether the aforesaid losses are recoverable in principle, but rather 
what standard of proof is necessary for recovery. 
(i) Proof as a Matter Governed by the Convention 
There has been controversy surrounding the issue of whether questions of 
proof are a procedural matter to be resolved in accordance with domestic 
law or whether they are implicitly regulated by the CISGY Whereas 
currently the clear prevailing opinion regards the burden of proof as a 
matter governed by the Convention,3 2 courts and commentators have 
29 Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 7 4, para 22; K Neumayer and C Ming, Convention de 
Vienne sur !es contrats de vente international de merchandises, Commentaire (Lausanne, 
CEDIDAC, I993) Art 74, para I. See also Delchi Carrier SpA v Rotorex Corp, 6 December 
I995, US Circuit Court of Appeals (2d Cir), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
95I206UI.html (accessed 28 June 2007). 
30 Cf P Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht (Tübingen, Mohr, 4th edn, 2007) 
para 299. 
31 See CISG-AC, above n 2, 2.I et seq. 
32 CISG-AC, above n 2, 2.I; C Brunner, UN-Kaufrecht-CISG. Kommentar zum 
übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationenüber Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf von 
r980 (Bern, Stämpfli, 2004) Art 74, Rn 58; Huber, above n 6, Art 74, para 58; Magnus, above 
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rejected the notion that the standard of proof is also governed by the 
Convention, as these questions were qualified as being procedural.33 Yet, 
the mere qualification of these rules as procedural or substantive cannot be 
the decisive factor.34 The principle of full compensation constitutes the core 
of all damages provisions of the CISG. Allowing different domestic rules on 
the level of proof would undermine not only the uniform interpretation of 
the CISG norms, but the core principle of full compensation itself. 
(ii) Standard of Proof 
With respect to the required standard, it is now widely held that a standard 
derived from the notion of reasonableness should be applied. Such reason-
ableness is, for example, laid down in Article 9:502(2)(b) PECL, as well as 
in Art1cle-7,4,3 (r) PICC; reasonableness is also a standard used by various 
CISG provisions themselves.3 5 The aggrieved party has to prove with 
reasonable certainty both the fact and the extent of loss. However, mathe-
maticäl precision cannot be required. The aggrieved party must only 
provide a basis on which a court or tribunal can reasonably determine the 
extent of damages, be it by expert testimony, economic and financial data, 
market surveys and analysis, or business records of similar enterprises.3 6 lt 
is then up to the court or tribunal to exercise its discretion in estimating the 
loss sustained. 
C Minimum Loss 
If no possibility at all exists to ascertain the actual loss, the expenditures the 
obligee made in expectation of performance must be taken as the minimum 
loss thc1.t must be compensated for. lt is reasonable to assume that the 
n 3, Art 74, para 62; Brölsch, above n I, 50; Saidov, 'Standards', above n I, 53 et seq. But see 
Case No Ch2709hooI, I5 November 2002, Cour deJustice Geneve (Appellate Court, Geneva, 
Switzerland) para 4, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/o2In5sI.html (accessed 27 
June 2007). 
33 For the United States see Delchi Carrier SpA v Rotorex Corp, above n 29; for Switzerland, 
see Case No T I7I/9 5, 20 February I997, Bezirksgericht der Saane (Zivilgericht) (District 
Court, Saane) para 6.4, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97022osI.html (accessed 
27 June 2007). See further Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, para 53; Huber, above n 6, Art 
74, para 57; Magnus, above n 3, Art 74, para 6I. 
34 CISG-AC, above n 2, 2.5; Gotanda, above n I, I09 et seq; CG Orlandi, 'Procedural Law 
Issues and Law Conventions' 5 (2000) Uniform Law Review 23, 24 et seq. 
35 See Arts 8(2) and (3), 25, 35(I)(b), 60, 72(2), 75, 77, 79(I), 85, 86 and 88(2); for 
'reasonable time', see Arts I8(2), 33(3), 39(I), 43(I), 47, 49, 63, 64, 65 and 73(2). See also 
CISG-AC, above n 2, 2.6 et seq; Gotanda, above n I, I26 et seq. 
36 See CISG-AC, above n 2, 2.9. 
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expenses incurred by a business person reflect what it may at the very least 
expect as payment.37 
IV NON-PECUNIARY LOSSES 
As has been shown, many of the losses usually characterised as 
non-pecuniary are in fact pecuniary losses if the performance principle is 
relied upon. Therefore, the distinction between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary losses, or material and immaterial losses, has to be established 
differently. 
The only remaining losses that are traditionally considered as 
non-pecuniary are 'pain and' suffering', 'mental distress' and 'loss of 
amenities'. Although Article 9:50I(2)(a) PECL3 8 and Article 7-4-2(2) PICC 
provide for the recovery of such losses in general, many of these losses 
already fall outside the scope of the Convention, since they flow from 
death or personal injury and therefore are already excluded by Article 5 
CISG. But even where such losses are in no way connected to personal 
injury, for example, emotional distress following the simple non-delivery 
or diminished enjoyment of the goods because of a defect, they are still 
comparable to personal injuries as they constitute at least a psychological 
injury. They thus fall clearly outside the scope of the Convention. 
Furthermore, unlike travel agents who get paid for procurement of the 
enjoyment of holidays and who, consequently, may be liable to pay general 
damages for disappointment,39 parties to international sales contracts do 
not contract and pay for the enjoyment and the amenities of life. 
V DISGORGMENT OF PROFITS AND GAIN-BASED DAMAGES 
As discussed extensively by other contributions in this collection, 4° the last 
decade has seen many court decisions and much academic debate in 
connection with the disgorgement of profits derived from a breach of 
contract. This debate is closely linked to the discussion about the purposes 
and aims of the law of damages in general, namely the transition from pure 
37 Schlechtriem, above n 29, para 308; N Schmidt-Ahrendts, 'Der Ersatz „frustrierter 
Aufwendungen" im Fall der Rückabwicklung gescheiterter Verträge im UN-Kaufrecht' [2006] 
Internationales Handelsrecht 69. 
38 Comment E. 
39 SeeJarvis vSwan Tours [I973] 2 QB 233;Jacksonv HorizonHolidays [I975] 1 WLR 1468 
(United Kingdom); BGH, NJW 1956, I234 and now § 651 f BGB (Germany); Art 14 PauRG 
(Switzerland). 
40 See A Burrows, 'Are "Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis" Compensatory, Restitutionary 
or Neither?', this volume; R Cunnington, 'The Measure and Availability of Gain-based 
Damages for Breach of Contract', this volume. 
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compensation of economic loss to mechanisms of deterrence in order to 
strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda. lt can be encapsulated 
by the following sentence: 'Breach of contract must not pay.' What stand 
does the CISG take on these developments? Except for the few authors who 
have laconically stated that under the CISG such disgorgement of profits 
may not be awarded,4I this question has yet to be addressed by the CISG 
community. 
First of all, it has to be noted that cases comparable to the well-known 
Blake42 case are hardly conceivable in an international sales context. 
However, in sales law the disgorgement of profits may play a role in the 
following cases: the seller who is already bound by the contract with the 
buye.r sells the goods for a second time at a higher purchase price, realising 
a higher profit than that in the first contract. Can the buyer claim the 
revenue of the second sales contract? Another example would be the 
already-mentioned hypothetical in which the buyer contracts for goods 
manufactured without child labour. Can the buyer claim a sum equal to 
the amount that the seller saved in the production process by employing 
children instead of adults? Finally, consider the case that formed the basis 
for a decision by the Grenoble Court of Appeal (France).43 Jeans were 
bought by the US buyer to be delivered to the buyer's customer in South 
Africa. The contract contained a provision prohibiting the buyer from 
selling the goods on the · European market as the seller had exclusive 
contracts with its European customers. The buyer subsequently resold the 
goods on the European market. Can the seller ask for the proceeds of the 
sales undertaken in breach of the contractual duty? In these cases, the 
CISG should not prevent the aggrieved party from demanding the proceeds 
made by the other party in its breach of contract. Two reasons justify this. 
First, in all these cases, the gains by the breaching party can easily be 
viewed -as nothing more than a presumption of what the aggrieved party 
has actually lost. Thus, we are still in the realm of compensatory damages. 
In the first example, of the seller selling the same goods twice, the higher 
purchase price that the breaching seller was able to realise can be seen as 
an indication and proof of what the true market conditions must have 
been at the time of the breach. The performance interest of the buyer, who 
has the right to the goods, compels granting it this amount. The same 
holds true for the second hypothetical-the child labour case. As has been 
41 Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, para 3I; Huber, above n 6, Art 74, para 16; Magnus, 
above n 3, Art 74, para I8; Brölsch, above n 1, 44; H Honsell, 'Die Vertragsverletzung des 
Verkäufers nach dem Wiener Kaufrecht' [1992] Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 36I. On the 
ULIS, see Adras Building Material v Harlow & Jones GmbH, Supreme Court of Israel, 2 
November I988, (1995) 3 Restitution Law Review 235. 
42 Attorney-General v Blake [200I] I AC 268 (HL). 
43 SARL BRI Production "Bonaventure" v Societe Pan African Export, 22 February 1995, 
CA Grenoble (Court of Appeal, Grenoble, France), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/950222fr.html (accessed 27 June 2007). 
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shown, the buyer is entitled to damages for the lesser value of the goods, 
as it has paid a higher price for having them manufactured under humane 
conditions. If it is difficult or impossible to determine the diminished value 
of goods produced under inhumane conditions, the savings made by the 
seller can be taken as a valuable yardstick in calculating the minimum loss 
of the buyer. Finally, in the case of the reimported jeans, the gains by the 
reselling buyer made in violation of the contract terms can be viewed as an 
indication of the seller's lost profits. Thus, in all of these cases, the 
question is not one of disgorgement of benefits, but of calculation of 
damages in accordance with the principle of full compensation. The 
second reason why the CISG cannot simply negate the issue of disgorge-
ment of profits and gain-based damages is that, otherwise, courts might 
resort to concurring domestic remedies in order to solve these currently 
virulent issues. Thereby, the CISG would be undermined in one of its core 
areas. 
VI PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
Punitive or exemplary damages is another area of the law that has been 
newly discovered by contract lawyers. Such damages are usually defined as 
sums awarded in excess of any compensatory or nominal damages in order 
to punish a party for outrageous misconduct. 44 Whereas jurists from the 
Germanic legal systems, in particular, have been and still are strictly 
opposed to any form of punitive damages,45 more and more common 
lawyers tend to advocate the concept of punitive damages, not only in tort, 
but also in contract law.46 
Under the CISG, it is generally held that punitive or exemplary damages 
may not be awarded47 because Article 74 CISG limits damages to 'a sum 
equal to the loss, including loss of profit . . . as a consequence of the 
breach'. Even the CISG-AC has recently upheld this position in its 2006 
44 For a comparative study, see JY Gotanda, 'Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis' 
(2004) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 391. 
45 BGH, 4 June I992, BGHZ n8, 3I2; F Bydlinski, 'Die Suche nach der Mitte als 
Daueraufgabe der Privatrechtswissenschaft' (2004) 204 Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 309, 
344 et seq. 
46 See R Cunnington, 'Should Punitive Damages be Part of the Judicial Arsenal in Contract 
Cases?' (2006) 26 Legal Studies 369 et seq; JA Sebert, 'Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in 
Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation' (I986} 
3 3 University of California Los Angeles Law Review I 5 6 5 et seq. 
47 Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, para 3 I; Magnus, above n 3, Art 74, para I7; Huber, 
above n 6, Art 74, para I6; Brunner, above n 30, Art 74, para I8; Brölsch, above n I, 43; but see 
Kirby, 'Punitive Damages in Contract Actions: The Tensions Between the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and U.S. Law' (I997} I6 Journal 
of Law and Commerce 2I5, 224 et seq. 
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opm10n on 'calculation of damages'.48 Nonetheless, however true this 
position might be from a dogmatic point of view, it overlooks the fact that, 
in practice, full compensation of the aggrieved party is hardly ever 
achieved, since all risks in awarding and assessing damages rest with the 
aggrieved party. lt has been rightly pointed out that the aggrieved party is, 
structurally, left undercompensated. 49 Thus, there is a strong argument 
that, at least in cases where the breach was intentional and in bad faith, 
punitive damages can serve primarily as a vehicle to assure that the 
aggrieved party achieves full compensation. 5° 
lt follows that, although under the CISG there may not be a possibility 
of an explicit punitive damages award, this should not preclude the court 
or tribunal from taking punitive elements into consideration when dealing 
with intentional and bad faith breaches of contract. This could not only 
influence the standard of proof to be applied but also the assessment of 
damages-in the individual case, in which the court or the tribunal is usually 
given a wide discretion. This becomes especially important in cases of loss 
of prq,fit, loss of a chance or loss of reputation. 
VII LEGAL COSTS 
Apart from the hitherto discussed fundamental questions of damages, there 
is one group of cases that has received a great deal of attention under 
Article 7 4 CISG lately: the recovery of expenses incurred in taking legal 
measures, in short, attorneys' feesY Article 7 4 CISG does not expressly 
address the recovery of legal costs by an aggrieved party in connection with 
seeking relief for breach of contract. 
Again, as in the area of questions of proof, the controversy centres on 
the issqe of whether the recovery of legal expenses is a procedural matter 
or a matter governed by the Convention's substantive provisions. Those in 
favour of the latter view, in particular, argue that Article 74 CISG must be 
broadly interpreted in light of the principle of full compensation; otherwise 
the aggrieved party would not be adequately recompensed.52 Likewise, as 
48 CISG-AC, above n 2, 9.5. 
49 Sebert, above n 44, I568. 
50 Ibid, I647 et seq. 
51 The dispute has been further fuelled by the decision in Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, SA v 
Hearthside Baking Company, Inc d!b/a Maurice Lenell Cooky Company, I9 November 2002, 
US Ct App (7th Cir), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/o2In9ur.html (accessed 27 
June 2007). For comment and analysis, see H Flechtner and J Lookofsky, 'Viva Zapata! 
American Procedure and CISG Substance in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal' (2003) 7 
Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 93 et seq. 
52 See B Zeller, 'Interpretation of Art 74-Zapata Hermanos v Hearthside Baking-Where 
Next?' [2004] Nordic Journal of Commercial Law I; Zeller, above n I, I48 et seq; J Felemegas, 
'The Award of Counsel's Fees Under Art 7 4 CISG, in Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v 
Hearthside Baking Co.' (200I) 6 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration 3 o, 3 8. 
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has been outlined in connection with the standard of proof, the problem 
of recovery of litigation costs cannot be solved through a substance/pro-
cedural distinction. Relying on such a distinction is outdated and 
unproductive.53 Instead, the analysis should focus on the purposes of 
damages under the CISG. 
The principle of full compensation, at first sight, seems to support the 
view that any expenses connected to the breach of contract, including legal 
costs, should be recoverable. However, such an interpretation is clearly 
against the principle of equality between buyer and seller. If legal expenses 
are awarded under Article 7 4 CISG, a successful claimant would be able to 
recover litigation expenses. But, as Justice Posner has rightly asked,54 what 
if the respondent won? Several proposals allowing the successful 
respondent the recovery of legal fees have proven unconvincing.55 Thus, 
the only solution nowadays favoured by courts and scholarly writings is 
that, under Article 74 CISG, neither party can recover expenses associated 
with the litigation arising from the breach.56 
Up until now, the focus has been on litigation costs. Despite the fact 
that, today, it is widely acknowledged that litigation costs may not be 
recovered under Article 7 4 CISG,57 the prevailing opinion in courts, 
tribunals and scholarly writings seem to hold that pre-litigation costs may 
be recovered as incidental damages under Article 7 4-58 Undoubtedly, this is 
correct as far as costs for the mitigation of damages are concerned, for 
53 See CISG-AC, above n 2, 5.2. 
54 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, above n 5L 
55 lt has been argued an unsuccessful claimant could be held liable for breach of the duty of 
good faith and therefore a successful respondent could rely on breach of contract, see J 
Felemegas, 'An Interpretation of Art 74 CISG by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals' (2003) 15 
Pace International Law Review 91, 126. 
56 CISG-AC, above n 2, 5.rff. See also A Mullis, 'Twenty-five Years On-The United 
Kingdom, Damages and the Vienna Sales Convention' (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 3 5, 44; Huber, above n 6, Art 7 4, para 4 3; Brunner, 
above n 30, Art 74, Rn 31; Brölsch, above n 1, 69; Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, para 20; 
Magnus, above n 3, Art 7 4, para 5 2; but see China International Economic & Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC), Award of II February 2000, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/0002ncI.html (accessed 27 June 2007). Commentators further advance Judge Posner's 
argument that the United States would not have ratified the CISG, if this had led to abolishing 
the so-called 'American Rule' (see Flechtner and Lookofsky, above n 49, 93ff; Schlechtriem, 
'Verfahrenskosten als Schaden unter UN-Kaufrecht' [2006] Internationales Handelsrecht 49, 
52). 
57 Seen 54, 
58 See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, above n 51); Case No 22 0 38/06, 12 December 2006, 
LG Coburg (District Court, Coburg, Germany), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
061212gI.html (accessed 27 June 2007); Case No 16 U 17/05, 3 April 2006, OLG Köln 
(Provincial Appellate Court, Köln, Germany), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
060403gLhtml (accessed 27 June 2007); Case No 32 0 508/04, ro December 2004, LG 
Bayreuth (District Court, Bayreuth, Germany), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
0412rogI.html (accessed 27 June 2007); Case No 6 U 210/03, 22 July 2004, OLG Düsseldorf 
(Provincial Appellate Court, Düsseldorf, Germany), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/040722gr.html (accessed 27 June 2007). See also Stoll and Gruber, above n 3, Art 74, 
para 20; Magnus, above n 3, Art 74, para 52. 
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example, for a cover transaction or costs for examining the goods twice 
after the delivery of substitute goods. There are, however, pre-litigation 
costs that are not neatly separated from these costs and that should not be 
recoverable as damages. These encompass especially the legal costs for the 
provisional assessment of the legal situation, of the possible outcome of 
any litigation and settlement negotiations. These costs may easily amount 
to hundreds of thousands of euros and, again, both parties incur these 
costs. Therefore, here, too, the above-stated principle of equality between 
the parties prohibits allowing a successful claimant to be able to liquidate 
these costs as damages under Article 74 CISG. Hence, not only expenses 
associated with litigation arising from the breach, but also those 
pre-litigation costs that are incurred in preparation for or instead of 
litigation have to fall outside of the scope of Article 7 4 CISG. 
VIII SUMMARY 
In surhmary, in many areas, the CISG provisions on damages still reflect the 
discussions prevailing in the mid-twentieth century. As German authors 
and courts haye been, and still are, at the forefront of interpreting the 
CISG, it comes as no great surprise that traditional notions of the German 
law on damages have exerted an important influence. They, in turn, are still 
deeply rooted in the nineteenth century. Under French law, courts have an 
extremely wide discretion in awarding damages. Thus, there has never been 
much fundamental discussion, in French court decisions, about the scope of 
the provisions on damages under the CISG either. Anglo-American courts 
and scholars have only recently discovered the CISG and there the debate is 
just starting. Aspiring to the idea that the CISG is to govern international 
sales transactions on a truly uniform basis, we have to apply and interpret 
its provisions in such a core area as damages in a truly comparative way. 
This irp.plies that we observe the discussions and developments in domestic 
laws and that we try to keep up with changed and still changing demands 
made by the international globalised market. In the law of damages this 
requires a shift from the nineteenth-century dogma of pure economic 
benefit to · the performance principle, which includes notions of 
disgorgement of gains and punitive elements. The consequences of such a 
shift affect all areas of damages: lesser value of the goods and lass of use, 
loss of profit, lass of a chance and lass of reputation. It is only in this way 
that the CISG can be prepared for the twenty-first ~entury and all its 
demands of a truly modern international sales law. 
